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OPINION 
______________ 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 This matter comes on before this Court on an appeal by 
appellant Healthcare Real Estate Partners, LLC, (“Healthcare”) 
challenging the District Court’s order affirming a bankruptcy 
court’s dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) of Healthcare’s 
adversary proceeding filed under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) seeking 
damages for violation of the automatic stay that arose by reason 
of the institution of the bankruptcy proceedings.  See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 362(a).  Healthcare contends that neither the District Court nor 
the bankruptcy court had a valid reason to dismiss its § 362(k) 
action without addressing its merits.  For the reasons stated 
below, we agree with Healthcare, and thus we will reverse the 
District Court’s order and remand the case to that Court to 
reinstate Healthcare’s § 362(k) action. 
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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
We rely on the District Court’s recitation of the facts in 
its opinion affirming the order of the bankruptcy court 
dismissing the § 362(k) action.  See Healthcare Real Estate 
Partners, LLC v. Summit Healthcare Reit, Inc., No. 17-1555, 
2018 WL 4500880, at *1-2 (D. Del. Sept. 19, 2018) (“HREP”).  
Nevertheless, we summarize the relevant facts.  Healthcare was 
the manager of certain investment funds.  On September 16, 
2015, the investors in the funds, petitioning creditors in the 
bankruptcy court, filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition 
against Healthcare with the intention of seeking its removal as 
the fund manager.  Because Healthcare had not been served with 
process in the bankruptcy case, it did not receive notice of the 
filing of the petition which consequently was uncontested and 
the bankruptcy court entered an order for relief on the petition.  
Subsequently, Healthcare was removed as the fund manager, 
and the investors installed Summit Healthcare Reit, Inc. 
(“Summit”) as the new fund manager.  Summit then dissolved 
the funds.  The petitioning creditors and Summit are the 
appellees on this appeal.1   
 About a month later, obviously having learned what had 
transpired, Healthcare filed a motion with the bankruptcy court, 
seeking to vacate the bankruptcy court’s order for relief on the 
petition due to the faulty service of process on it.  The 
bankruptcy court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion 
which it then granted, vacating its prior order for relief.  Then, 
                                                 
1 The clerk of this Court entered an order on November 6, 2018, 
providing that Summit’s attorney shall be the designated filer for 
all appellees. 
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having achieved their objective, appellees moved to voluntarily 
dismiss the petition.  Healthcare opposed dismissal asserting that 
it had claims for damages against appellees under 11 U.S.C. § 
303(i) because it contended that the petitioning creditors had 
filed the petition in bad faith.2  The bankruptcy court granted the 
motion for voluntary dismissal, but retained jurisdiction in the 
order of dismissal in which it included a provision stating that 
“nothing herein shall limit [Healthcare’s] right to seek damages, 
including without limitation, fees and costs, pursuant to 11 
U.S.C. § 303(i) or otherwise.”  HREP at *2.  The court, 
however, did not explain what it meant by “or otherwise.”  The 
parties treat the meaning of this term as the major issue on this 
appeal though, as will be seen, we take a different approach. 
Thereafter, Healthcare filed a motion in the bankruptcy 
court seeking § 303(i) damages.  It also instituted an adversary 
proceeding against appellees asserting § 362(k) claims for 
                                                 
2 Healthcare contends that it informed the bankruptcy court of its 
intention to assert claims under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) for violation 
of the automatic stay provision of the bankruptcy code.  After 
the investors removed Healthcare as the fund manager and 
installed Summit as the new fund manager, the fund was 
dissolved without the bankruptcy court’s knowledge.  On the 
appeal, the District Court rejected Healthcare’s assertion that it 
had made its intentions regarding § 362(k) known to the 
bankruptcy court.  HREP, 2018 WL 4500880, at *1 
(“[Healthcare] did not state in its objection that it would also 
seek damages under § 362(k).”).  Because we need not resolve 
this factual dispute, we will assume, as the District Court found, 
that Healthcare did not reveal its intentions about § 362(k) 
claims during its opposition to the voluntary dismissal of the 
petition. 
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violation of the automatic stay that arose in the bankruptcy 
proceedings when the petition was filed because of the removal 
of Healthcare as the fund manager and the installation of 
Summit in that role without an order of the court.  The appellees 
moved to dismiss the § 362(k) action, arguing that it was outside 
of the scope of the bankruptcy court’s order dismissing the 
petition which they asserted allowed Healthcare to seek only § 
303(i) damages.  The bankruptcy court agreed, stating that “the 
Court [has] authority to limit you for what you can bring after 
dismissal of the case, and that’s what I intended to do.”  HREP, 
2018 WL 4500880, at *5.  That court made clear that when it 
dismissed the petition its intent was to allow Healthcare to bring 
a claim for damages only under § 303(i).  Therefore, the court 
dismissed the § 362(k) action on October 19, 2017, and, on 
Healthcare’s appeal, the District Court affirmed on September 
19, 2018, largely by adopting the bankruptcy court’s reasoning.  
This appeal followed. 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
In dismissing Healthcare’s § 362(k) action, the 
bankruptcy court, and thus the District Court in reliance on the 
bankruptcy court’s reasoning held that (1) the bankruptcy court 
lacked jurisdiction over the § 362(k) claims because when it 
dismissed the petition, it retained jurisdiction only over the § 
303(i) claims, and (2) even if it could have retained jurisdiction 
over the § 362(k) claims, it had discretion to limit the claims 
Healthcare could assert before it following the dismissal of the 
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petition.  We disagree in both respects.3 
We start our discussion by addressing an argument that 
appellees advance that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal.  
Under their argument because the bankruptcy case will be 
ongoing until the § 303(i) claims are resolved, which so far as 
we are aware has not happened, the order dismissing the § 
362(k) claims was not a final appealable order, as not all claims 
asserted in the bankruptcy court have been resolved.  See H.E. v. 
Walter D. Palmer Leadership Learning Partners Charter Sch., 
873 F.3d 406, 411 (3d Cir. 2017).  However, that argument 
presumes that the § 362(k) claims must be part of the 
bankruptcy case.  But because, as we explain below, § 362(k) 
actions are separate and apart from the related bankruptcy cases 
in which they arise and thus stand on their own, we reject that 
argument.  After all, if Healthcare’s § 362(k) action is 
independent of the overall bankruptcy proceedings, the dismissal 
of the § 362(k) action would constitute a final order in both the 
bankruptcy court and the District Court and thus would be 
appealable to us, even if the underlying bankruptcy proceedings 
are still pending in either of those courts.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 
                                                 
3 In the motion to dismiss filed with the bankruptcy court, 
appellees did not specify what federal rule they were moving 
under, nor did the bankruptcy court articulate which rule formed 
the basis of its dismissal order.  The District Court, on appeal, 
categorized the motion as a Rule 12(b) motion, without 
explicitly stating which subsection of Rule 12(b) applied.  While 
we believe the motion could have been filed under Rule 12(b)(1) 
or 12(b)(6), ultimately the distinction is not significant here, as 
we would exercise plenary review in either case.  See In re 
Schering Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer Class Action, 
678 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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1291 & 158(d)(1). 
Section 362(k) states, in relevant part, that “an individual 
injured by any willful violation of a stay provided by this section 
shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ 
fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive 
damages.”  11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1).  That statute, at least not in 
terms, does not require an action brought pursuant to it to be 
filed in an existing bankruptcy proceeding.  Though we have not 
clearly addressed the question of whether § 362(k) actions must 
be filed in an existing bankruptcy proceeding, other courts of 
appeals have held that § 362(k) actions are separate and apart 
from any related bankruptcy cases, and thus stand on their own.  
In re Johnson, 575 F.3d 1079, 1083-84 (10th Cir. 2009); see 
Houck v. Substitute Tr. Servs., Inc., 791 F.3d 473, 481 (4th Cir. 
2015); Price v. Rochford, 947 F.2d 829, 830-31 (7th Cir. 1991); 
Pettitt v. Baker, 876 F.2d 456, 457-58 (5th Cir. 1989). 
In reaching its conclusion that recognized the separate 
status of § 362(k) actions, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit in Johnson reasoned that: 
It is particularly appropriate for bankruptcy courts 
to maintain jurisdiction over § 362(k)(1) 
proceedings because their purpose is not negated 
by dismissal of the underlying bankruptcy case.  
They still serve (a) to compensate for losses that 
are not extinguished by the termination of the 
bankruptcy case and (b) to vindicate the authority 
of the statutory stay . . . .  Requiring the dismissal 
of a § 362(k)(1) proceeding simply because the 
underlying bankruptcy case has been dismissed 
would not make sense.  A court must have the 
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power to compensate victims of violations of the 
automatic stay and punish the violators, even after 
the conclusion of the underlying bankruptcy case. 
 
Johnson, 575 F.3d at 1083 (citations omitted).  The court went 
on to explain that: 
Nothing in the Bankruptcy Code mandates 
dismissal of the § 362(k)(1) proceeding when the 
bankruptcy case is closed . . . .  No part of § 
362(k)(1) suggests that a claim exists only while 
the bankruptcy case remains pending.  And when 
Congress listed the effects of dismissing a 
bankruptcy case, it included nothing about 
automatically terminating the court’s jurisdiction 
over all adversary proceedings or mooting 
questions regarding § 362(k)(1) sanctions . . . .  
[C]ontrary to [the creditor’s] assertions, we see no 
basis for requiring a bankruptcy court to state 
explicitly that it is retaining jurisdiction over a § 
362(k)(1) adversary proceeding when it dismisses 
an underlying [bankruptcy] case, or for requiring 
[the debtor] to move to reopen the [bankruptcy] 
case to pursue the § 362(k)(1) adversary 
proceeding. 
 
Id. at 1084 (internal quotations and citations omitted).  We agree 
with the Johnson court’s reasoning, and except in one respect 
that we set forth below adopt it here.  We do not discern any 
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reason why a determination of whether an automatic stay had 
been violated must be litigated as part of the bankruptcy 
proceedings. 
 We, however, question Johnson to the extent it can be 
construed as stating that § 362(k) actions only can be “core 
proceedings” under the bankruptcy code.  Id. at 1083.  The 
jurisdictional statute for bankruptcy courts states that 
“[b]ankruptcy judges may hear and determine all cases under 
title 11 and all core proceedings arising under title 11, or arising 
in a case under title 11, referred under subsection (a) of this 
section, and may enter appropriate orders and judgments, subject 
to review under section 158 of this title.”  28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1). 
 The statute clearly differentiates between “cases” under title 11 
and “core proceedings” under title 11.  This distinction is 
unsurprising, as bankruptcy cases are unique in the federal 
system.  Courts in bankruptcy cases routinely adjudicate 
contract, probate, property, and other state-law claims without 
regard for the diversity of the parties’ citizenship if the 
resolution of matters in dispute is appropriate in the disposition 
of a bankruptcy case.  Thus, the “core proceeding” clause of § 
157(b)(1) vests jurisdiction in a bankruptcy court to adjudicate 
claims over which it otherwise would not have jurisdiction.  See 
§ 157(b)(2) (listing examples of core proceedings); Halper v. 
Halper, 164 F.3d 830, 836 (3d Cir. 1999).  Indeed, appellees rely 
on this point to argue that the bankruptcy court could not have 
jurisdiction over the § 362(k) action because its jurisdiction over 
any claim necessarily derives from the existence of a bankruptcy 
case and the bankruptcy court dismissed the bankruptcy case 
prior to the institution of the § 362(k) proceeding. 
While the statutes certainly allow a bankruptcy court to 
adjudicate § 362(k) claims as “core proceedings,” they do not 
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require plaintiffs to bring such claims in that fashion.  As we 
stated above, nothing in § 362(k) requires that an action filed 
under that provision be part of an existing bankruptcy 
proceeding.  Instead, a § 362(k) action is an independent private 
cause of action, meant to vindicate the right of a debtor to an 
automatic stay during a bankruptcy proceeding.  Therefore, even 
if a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over a § 362(k) action is not 
predicated on the “core proceeding” clause of § 157(b)(1), its 
jurisdiction can be based on the express grant of jurisdiction to 
the bankruptcy courts in § 157(b)(1) that they “may hear and 
determine all cases under title 11[.]”  As the Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit explained, 
We are cognizant that there are scant primary or 
secondary authorities applying or discussing [§ 
362(k)].  Nor is there a plethora of enlightening 
references in the relevant legislative history.  We 
do not consider such essential, however, to 
today’s task.  To hold that [§ 362(k)] does not 
create a private right of action would require us to 
ignore its plain and express language.  As we read 
that language, we cannot but conclude that 
Congress established a remedy for an individual 
injured by a willful violation of a section 362(a) 
stay. 
 
Pettitt, 876 F.2d at 457-58.  See Justice Cometh, Ltd. v. 
Lambert, 426 F.3d 1342, 1343 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding that 
district courts have original jurisdiction over § 362(k) actions 
because they are “cases” under title 11, which then could be 
referred to the bankruptcy court under § 157(a)). 
  12 
Our result should not surprise anyone.  After all, other 
courts of appeals have held that § 362(k) creates independent 
private causes of action.  See, e.g., Houck, 791 F.3d at 481 
(“Congress created a private cause of action for the willful 
violation of a stay, authorizing an individual injured by any such 
violation to recover damages.”); Price, 947 F.2d at 830-31 (“We 
hold that 11 U.S.C. § 362([k]) creates a cause of action that can 
be enforced after bankruptcy proceedings have terminated.”); 
see also Garfield v. Cowen Loan Servicing, LLC, 811 F.3d 86, 
91-92 (2d Cir. 2016) (indicating that § 362(k) creates a cause of 
action for violations of the automatic stay provision).  Put 
another way, while the institution of a bankruptcy proceeding at 
some point is necessary for the institution of a § 362(k) action, 
the institution of a new or the continuation of an existing § 
362(k) action does not depend on the continued existence of that 
proceeding. 
 It is also notable that even though the court indicated in 
Johnson that § 362(k) actions are core proceedings, in a 
subsequent opinion the same court made clear that a § 362(k) 
action brought while a bankruptcy proceeding was pending may 
be continued after the dismissal of the related bankruptcy case.  
In re Cowen, 849 F.3d 943, 947-48 (10th Cir. 2017).  Curiously, 
the Johnson court also stated that “[c]ore proceedings are 
proceedings which have no existence outside of bankruptcy.  
Actions which do not depend on the bankruptcy laws for their 
existence and which could proceed in another court are not core 
proceedings.”  575 F.3d at 1082.  Therefore, while it is unclear 
how the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit would treat a § 
362(k) action brought after the dismissal of the underlying 
bankruptcy proceeding, it in no way held that a bankruptcy court 
would not have jurisdiction in that scenario.  In any event, as we 
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have indicated the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over 
Healthcare’s § 362(k) adversary action even if a § 362(k) 
proceeding is not a core proceeding because a § 362(k) action no 
matter when instituted is a case under title 11.  As such, the 
District Court erred in finding that the bankruptcy court did not 
have jurisdiction over Healthcare’s § 362(k) action. 
 Of course, our conclusion that § 362(k) creates a private 
cause of action leads us to conclude that the bankruptcy court 
and the District Court erred in holding the bankruptcy court had 
the authority to limit what claims Healthcare could bring in the 
bankruptcy court after the dismissal of the bankruptcy petition.  
As a rule, federal courts must hear matters within their 
jurisdiction.  Sprint Commc’ns v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 77, 134 
S.Ct. 584, 590-91 (2013).  That rule applies to bankruptcy 
courts.  Congress authorized bankruptcy courts to exercise 
jurisdiction based on referral from the district court.  See 28 
U.S.C. § 157(a).  “When a case is referred under § 157(a), 
Congress surely intends that all jurisdiction otherwise vested in 
the district courts be exercised by the bankruptcy judges,” unless 
§ 157 expressly provides otherwise.  William L. Norton III, 1 
Norton Bankr. L. & Prac. § 4:36 (3d ed. 2019); cf. Stern v. 
Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 480, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 2607 (2011) 
(“Section 157 allocates the authority to enter final judgment 
between the bankruptcy court and the district court.  That 
allocation does not implicate questions of subject matter 
jurisdiction.” (citation omitted)).  Hence, “[w]here a bankruptcy 
court has jurisdiction but is not in a position to avail itself of 
statutory or nonstatutory abstention, it must exercise its 
jurisdiction,” In re Johnson, 346 B.R. 190, 194 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
2006), assuming, of course, that the bankruptcy’s authority to 
adjudicate the matter is constitutional under Stern. 
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Even if we view the bankruptcy court’s reasoning as 
essentially being based on claim preclusion, on the theory that 
because Healthcare did not assert its § 362(k) claims in the 
bankruptcy case while those proceedings were pending it cannot 
raise the claims in a later case, that observation would not lead 
us to uphold the dismissal of the § 362(k) action.  After all, 
federal claim preclusion requires “(1) a final judgment on the 
merits in a prior suit involving (2) the same parties or their 
privies and (3) a subsequent suit based on the same cause of 
action.”  In re Mullarkey, 536 F.3d 215, 225 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(citation omitted).  Here, the substantive issue to be decided in 
the § 362(k) action was not litigated in the bankruptcy case.  
Thus, even if we found that the § 303(i) claims are based on the 
same cause of action as the § 362(k) action, which we certainly 
do not,4 those claims are still pending and no final judgment on 
their merits has issued.  Accordingly, we cannot affirm the 
District Court’s order finding that the bankruptcy court had 
authority to bar Healthcare from filing its § 362(k) action on 
claim preclusion grounds. 
 We have not ignored the fact that as we noted above, the 
order dismissing the petition provided that “nothing herein shall 
limit [Healthcare’s] right to seek damages, including without 
                                                 
4 Beyond the obvious fact that the § 303(i) and § 362(k) claims 
arose from separate statutes, a determination of whether the 
bankruptcy petition was initiated in bad faith, the issue on the § 
303(i) motion, is completely different than a determination of 
whether there was a violation of the automatic stay provision by 
reason of Healthcare’s removal.  While some of the same 
underlying facts may be significant in both determinations, 
proof of one does not necessarily constitute proof in the other.   
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limitation, fees and costs, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 303(i) or 
otherwise.”  The bankruptcy court interpreted the order to 
preserve Healthcare’s right to bring a motion for damages under 
§ 303(i) but not its right to bring an action under § 362(k) for 
violation of the automatic stay.  On appeal the District Court 
held that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in 
coming to this conclusion.  Consequently, that Court held that 
the bankruptcy court did not err when it dismissed the § 362(k) 
action.  But we are not going to decipher the meaning of 
“otherwise”, as it is immaterial. 
In their brief, appellees recite that “[t]he sole issue on this 
Appeal is whether the bankruptcy court has the power to 
interpret its own orders.”  Appellee’s br. at 8.  This statement of 
the issue is incorrect because we do not have to consider what 
the bankruptcy court meant when it preserved Healthcare’s right 
to seek damages “pursuant to § 303(i) or otherwise” inasmuch 
as the dismissal of the bankruptcy proceedings in the bankruptcy 
court did not foreclose a subsequent § 362(k) action by 
Healthcare no matter what the bankruptcy court intended when 
it dismissed the bankruptcy petition.   
Our final observation is that the District Court in 
reaching its result may have been relying in part on its view that 
the § 362(k) action and the § 303(i) claims seek recovery for the 
same injury.  But that possibility does not affect our result for 
the Court on the remand that we are ordering will be able to bar 
a double recovery for the same injury even if Healthcare is able 
to establish appellees’ liability on both bases.  Furthermore, the 
Court has the discretion to consolidate the two proceedings 
under appropriate circumstances which seem to be present here. 
 An additional point is that even if a plaintiff can establish that a 
defendant is liable for a single injury on two different bases that 
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does not mean that it can recover on both bases.  After all, it is 
axiomatic that a plaintiff may assert multiple claims for the same 
injury; indeed, Healthcare may be able to establish liability on 
one theory, but not the other.  See Int’l Refugee Assistance 
Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233, 258 (4th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he 
same injury can provide Plaintiffs with standing for multiple 
claims.”), rev’d on other grounds, 138 S.Ct. 2710 (2018).   
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
In summary, we conclude that the District Court erred in 
affirming the bankruptcy court’s dismissal of Healthcare’s § 
362(k) action.  Accordingly, we will reverse the District Court’s 
September 19, 2018 order, and will remand the matter to that 
Court to reinstate the § 362(k) action.  We do not preclude the 
District Court from further remanding the case to the bankruptcy 
court. 
 
